Abstract. This paper puts forward a new efficient construction for Multi-Receiver Signcryption in the Identity-based setting. We consider a scenario where a user wants to securely send a message to a dynamically changing subset of the receivers in such a way that non-members of the of this subset cannot learn the message. The obvious solution is to transmit an individually signcrypted message to every member of the subset. This requires a very long transmission (the number of receivers times the length of the message) and high computation cost. Another simple solution is to provide every possible subset of receivers with a key. This requires every user to store a huge number of keys. In this case, the storage efficiency is compromised. The goal of this paper is to provide solutions which are efficient in all three measures i.e. transmission length, storage of keys and computation at both ends. We propose a new scheme that achieve both confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously in this setting and is the most efficient scheme to date, in the parameters described above. It breaks the barrier of ciphertext length of linear order in the number of receivers, and achieves constant sized ciphertext, independent of the size of the receiver set. This is the first Multi-receiver Signcryption scheme to do so. We support the scheme with security proofs under a precisely defined formal security model.
Introduction
Two fundamental tools of Public Key Cryptography are privacy and authenticity, achieved through encryption and signatures respectively. Signcryption, introduced by Zheng [27] , is a cryptographic primitive that offers confidentiality and unforgeability simultaneously similar to the sign-then-encrypt technique, but with lesser computational complexity and lower communication cost. The security notion for signcryption was first formally defined in 2002 by Baek et al. in [3] .
The concept of an Identity based (ID-based) cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir [22] in 1984. The idea is that users within a system could use their online identifiers (combined with certain system-wide information) as their public keys. This greatly reduces the problems with key management and provides a more convenient alternative to conventional public key infrastructure. Only in 2001 did first fully practical identity-based encryption (IBE) solution arise, using bilinear mappings over elliptic curves [9] .
ID-based signcryption schemes achieve the functionality of signcryption with the added advantage that ID-based cryptography provides. In [18] , Malone-Lee gave the first ID-based signcryption scheme. Since then, quite a few ID-based signcryption schemes have been proposed ( [17] , [5] , [12] ). To date, some of the most efficient ID-based signcryption schemes are that of Chen et al. [12] , and Barreto et al. [5] 
Related Work
Multi-receiver Encryption. The concept of multi-receiver public key encryption was independently formalized by Bellare, Boldyreva, and Micali [7] , and Baudron, Pointcheval, and Stern [6] . Security of public key encryption in the single-receiver setting implies the security in the multi-receiver setting. Hence, for example, one can construct a semantically secure multireceiver public key encryption scheme by simply encrypting a message under n different public keys of a semantically secure single-receiver public key encryption scheme. But this is inefficient in the sense that the process of encryption is performed n times. Later, Kurosawa [16] proposed a technique called randomness re-use to improve the computational efficiency in multi-receiver public key encryption schemes.
Multi-receiver Identity-Based Encryption. Chen, Harrison, Soldera, and Smart [11] considered conjunction and disjunction of private keys associated with multiple identities in Boneh and Franklin's IBE scheme. Regarding conjunction, users possesing all the private keys associated with the identities that were used to encrypt a message can decrypt the ciphertext. Considering disjunction, a user who possesses one of the private keys associated with identities that were used to encrypt the message can decrypt the ciphertext. [11] and [23] show how Boneh and Franklin's IBE scheme can be modified to solve the conjunction and disjunction problems efficiently. However, these schemes are not supported by a formal security model and appropriate proofs. Later Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo [2] considered this problem. Along with a formal definition and security model for Multi-receiver Identity-Based Encryption, they proposed a construction based on the Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption scheme. This protocol was proved secure in the random oracle model.
Multi-receiver ID-based Key Encapsulation. The notion of mKEM was introduced by Smart in [24] . Later, in [4] , the notion of mKEM was extended to multi-receiver identity based key encapsulation (mID-KEM), i.e. mKEM in the identity-based setting. In [2] and [4] , the ciphertext size grows with the number of receivers. In [10] , Chatterjee and Sarkar achieved a controllable trade-off between the ciphertext size and the private key size: ciphertexts are of size |S|/N , and private keys are of size N where S is the set of receivers and N a parameter of the protocol (which also represents, in the security reduction, the maximum number of identities that the adversary is allowed to target). Thus they introduced the first mID-KEM protocols to achieve sub-linear ciphertext sizes. Very recently, Abdalla et al. proposed in [1] a generic construction that achieves ciphertexts of constant size, but private keys of size O(n 2 max ). Furukawa [20] and Delerablée [13] independently proposed an mID-KEM scheme which achieves constant size ciphertext at the cost of the public key size growing linearly in the number of receivers.
Multi-receiver ID-based Signcryption. In the multi-receiver identity-based setting, we are interested in the situation where there is not only a single sender to multiple receivers, but also multiple senders. In such cases, it is desirable to achieve confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously. To our knowledge, identity-based signcryption in the multi-receiver setting has not been much treated in the literature. One might argue that by adding sender authentication by using a secure digital signature scheme to a multi-receiver encryption scheme will achieve this purpose. However, such combinations may suffer from hidden security weakness as observed by Duan and Cao in [14] . Also, they proposed the first mIBSC scheme and specified the formal security notions for the same. The multireceiver scheme proposed by Duan and Cao was shown be insecure by C H Tan by demonstrating an attack on the confidentiality of duan et al.'s scheme. Yu et al. [26] also proposed a mIBSC scheme in 2008. Sharmila et al. in [21] have shown that the scheme by Yu et al. is not secure i.e. it is forgeable and is not confidential. Also they have given a fix for Yu et al.'s scheme in [21] . To the best of our knowledge the scheme in [21] is the only secure identity-based scheme available in literature till date.
Our Contribution
Following the above discussion, a natural question one can ask is how to design a multi-receiver identity-based signcryption scheme that achieves both confidentiality and authenticity, and broadcasts a message with a high-level of computational and storage efficiency and optimal transmission length while retaining security. In this paper, we introduce an efficient scheme to answer this question. The major advantage of our scheme is, it sends only three components to all the receivers. That is the size of the ciphertext is a constant and is independent of the number of receivers. However, all the other systems existing in the literature have ciphertext size proportional to the number of receivers. But this is achieved at the cost of storage efficiency. The size of the public key grows as the maximal size of the subset of receivers in the group (which can be significantly less than the total number of people in the group). This construction, when converted to a Broadcast Encryption scheme [15] , is comparable to the Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE) schemes proposed by Furukawa [20] and Delerablée [13] . We also provide formal security notions for Multi-receiver Identity-Based Signcryption (mIBSC) schemes and formally prove the construction secure in the random oracle model by reducing its security to standard assumptions related to the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problems.
Remark It is a common practice in group oriented protocols to ignore the part of the broadcast ciphertext that identifies the target subset of users. We distinguish between the set identification transmission and the message signcryption transmission. Our goal is the study of latter and their requirements. What is called ciphertext size usually refers to the size of the header that corresponds to the message signcryption alone.
Preliminaries
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group of prime order p, with generators P and Q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order p.
Bilinear Pairing
A bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties.
-Bilinearity. For all P, Q, R ∈ G 1 ,
• e(P + Q, R) = e(P, R)e(Q, R)
• e(P, Q + R) = e(P, Q)e(P, R)
• e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)
-Non-Degeneracy. There exist P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = I G 2 , where I G 2 is the identity element of G 2 . -Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Computational Assumptions
In this section, we review the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps that are relevant to the protocol we discuss.
Let B = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group system such that
Definition 1
The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the l − SDHP in G is defined as Adv
The l-SDHP Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advan-
is negligibly small.
The General Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption
We make use of the generalization of the Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption due to Boneh, Boyen and Goh [8] . Let m, n be positive integers and U, V ∈ F p [X 1 , ..., X n ] m be two m-tuples of n-variate polynomials over F p . Thus, U and V are just two sets containing m multivariate polynomials each. We write U = (u 1 , u 2 , ..., u m ) and V = (v 1 , v 2 , ..., v m ) as tuples of polynomials and impose that u 1 = v 1 = 1; that is, the constant polynomials 1. For a set Ω, a function h : F p → Ω and vector (x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ F n p , we write
We use a similar notation for the m-tuple
It is said that F depends on (U, V ), which we denote by F ∈ U, V , when there exists a linear decomposition
Let U, V be as above and
The (U, V, F )-General Diffie-Hellman Exponent problems are defined as follows.
Definition 2 ((U, V, F )-GDHE) : Given the tuple
H(x 1 , ..., x n ) = [U (x 1 , ..., x n )]G 0 , g V (x 1 ,...,xn) ∈ G m × G m T , (U, V, F )-GDHE asks to compute g F (x 1 ,...,xn) . Definition 3 ((U, V, F)-GDDHE). Given H(x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ G m × G m T as above and T ∈ G T , (U, V, F )-GDDHE problem is to decide whether T = g F (x 1 ,...,xn) .
Definition 4 The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the
The (U, V, F)-GDDHE Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv
Complexity Bound in Generic Bilinear Groups
We state the following upper bound in the framework of the generic group model. We are given oracles to compute the induced group action on G, G T , and an oracle to compute a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G × G → G T . We refer to G as a generic bilinear group. The following theorem gives an upper bound on the advantage of a generic algorithm in solving the decision (U, V, F ) − GDDHE problem.
If F / ∈ U, V then for any generic-model adversary A totalizing at mostueries to the oracles (group operations in G, G T and evaluations of e) which is given H(x 1 , ..., x n ) as input and tries to distinguish g F (x 1 ,...,xn) from a random value in G T , one has
We refer to [8] for a proof that (U, V, F ) − GDHE and (U, V, F ) − GDDHE have generic security when F / ∈ U, V . In our constructions, the order of the groups (p) that we consider is exponential in the security parameter λ.
Multi-Receiver Identity-Based Signcryption(mIBSC)
A generic mIBSC for sending a single message to t users consists of the following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, -Setup(k, N ). Given a security parameter k and the size of the maximal set of receivers 1 N , the Private Key Generator (PKG) generates the public parameters params and master secret key M SK of the system. -Extract(ID, M SK). Given an identity ID, the PKG computes the corresponding private key
user with identity ID A runs this algorithm to obtain the signcrypted ciphertext σ.
. When a user with identity ID i and private key S i receives the signcrypted ciphertext σ and runs this algorithm to obtain either the plain text m or ⊥ according as whether σ was a valid signcryption from identity ID A to or not.
Security Model
The notion of semantic security of public key encryption was extended to identity-based signcryption scheme by Malone-Lee in [18] . We describe the security models for confidentiality and unforgeability below. Unforgeability A signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-mIBSC-CMA) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the master public and private keys params and M SK respectively. C gives system public parameters params to A. A outputs the target identity ID * on which he would like to be challenged. 2. The adversary A makes polynomially bounded number of queries to the oracles as described in
Step 2 of the confidentiality game with the constraint that no Extract query is made on ID * . 3. Finally A produces a signcrypted ciphertext σ * along with the receivers' identities ID * 1 , ID * 2 , . . . , ID * t . A wins the game if -The result of Designcrypt(σ * , ID * A , ID * i ) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ t results in a valid message m * .
-No query to O Signcrypt involved m * , ID * A and any set of receivers. Here the adversary A is allowed the private keys of Note. The above definitions for security in the sense of Confidentiality and Unforgeability only model the case where the adversary is static. We can analogously define security against adaptive adversaries by not posing the restriction of specifying the set that the adversary is going to attack beforehand. Modeling a scheme that is secure against adaptive adversaries is an open problem
mIBSC
In this section, we present a scheme that achieves constant-sized ciphertexts and private keys. The size of the public keys is that of the maximal subset of receivers.
mIBSC has the following algorithms.
-Setup(λ, N ) The security parameter of the scheme is λ and N is the maximal size of the set of receivers. G 1 , G 2 are two groups of prime order p, where |p| = λ. P and Q are generators of G 1 and e is a bilinear map defined as e :
Let n 0 and n 1 denote the number of bits required to represent an identity and a message respectively. Three hash functions
chooses s ∈ R Z * p and computes R = sP and g = e(P, Q). The public parameters are
The Master Secret Key is M SK = s, P .
-Extract(ID, M SK) The public key and private key of identity ID are H 1 (ID) and S ID = 
The signcrypted ciphertext is σ = c, X, y, L , where L is the list of receivers who can decrypt the message.
-Designcrypt(σ, ID A , ID i , S i ) A receiver with identity ID i uses his secret key S i to designcrypt σ = c, X, y, L from ID A as follows. 1. Compute the following.
(a) α = e (S i , y) .e X,
Note : To compute the above expression
Q is a polynomial of degree (t − 1) in s WITHOUT a constant term and thus the expression
Qis a polynomial say f (s), of degree (t − 2) in s. Since sQ, s 2 Q, . . . , s (t−2) Q where t ≤ N , are all available in master public parameters params, f (s)Q can be computed. Thus, Correctness. It is easy to see that the above decryption algorithm is consistent. Indeed, if σ is a valid ciphertext to ID i ,
Hence, α = β
) be a bilinear map group system and let f and g be two coprime polynomials with pairwise distinct roots, of respective orders l and t. Let P 0 and Q 0 be generators of G 1 . Given
and T ∈ G 2 , solving the (U, V, F ) − GDDHE problem consists of deciding whether T is equal to e(P 0 , Q 0 ) γ·f (s) or is some random element of G 2 .
Corollary 1 (Generic security of (U, V, F )−GDDHE). For any probabilistic algorithm A that totalizes of at mostueries to the oracles performing the group operations in G 1 , G 2 and the bilinear map e(·, ·),
Proof. Refer Appendix C Theorem 2. Assume that an IND-mIBSC-CCA adversary A has an advantage against mIBSC, asking at most l extraction queries. Then there is an algorithm R to solve the (U, V, F ) − GDDHE problem with advantage
Proof. Refer Appendix A Theorem 3. Assume that an EUF-mIBSC-CMA adversary A making l extraction queries, q H i queries to random oracles H i (i= 1,2,3) and q sc signcryption queries, has an advantage ≥ 10(q sc + 1)(q sc + q H 2 )/2 k has an advantage against mIBSC. Then there is an algorithm R to solve the (l + N ) − SDHP with advantage
Proof. Refer Appendix B
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge identity-based multireceiver signcryption schemes reported in literature are [14] [26]. However, Tan [25] has broken the scheme reported in [14] and Sharmila et al. have shown the flaws in [26] and given the fix for the same. Hence the only existing correct scheme is the scheme reported in [21] . This paper makes a significant improvement over the scheme in [21] and hence this is by far the best scheme available till date. We also formally prove the security of these schemes in the sense of confidentiality and unforgeability, based on the l − SDHP and the GDDHE assumptions. The major flaws in all the broken systems are all related to the insider security of the schemes. In the scheme proposed in this paper we have specifically addressed the issue and designed the scheme with proven insider security.
To our knowledge, no public key multi-receiver encryption scheme is known to resist fully adaptive adversaries. We leave this as an open problem. Another interesting problem would be to design a scheme that is secure under weaker assumptions and achieves efficiency comparable to ours. [14] O
, which is a polynomial of degree l − 1
Init Phase: The adversary A outputs a t-set S * = {ID * 1 , ..., ID * t } of identities that he wants to attack. Setup Phase: To generate the system parameters, R formally sets P = f (s)P 0 (i.e. without computing it) and sets
R then defines the Public Key PK as Q, sQ, s 2 Q, . . . , s N Q, R, g. Note R cannot compute the value of P . Query phase 1: At any time the adversary A can query the following random oracles. To respond to these queries, R maintains three lists
(we choose to note * an empty entry in L H 1 ). When the adversary issues a hash query on identity ID i , -If ID i already appears in the list L H 1 , R responds with the corresponding x i . -Otherwise, R picks an x i for some ( * , x i ) in L H 1 , returns H(ID i ) = x i , and completes the list with (ID i , x i ). 2. Extraction query (ID i ): The challenger runs Extract on ID i / ∈ S * and forwards the resulting private key to the adversary. To generate the keys, -If A has already issued a hash query on ID i , then R uses the corresponding x i to compute As one can see, the returned ciphertext will pass off as a valid one as
. Designcryption Queries : Of the form (σ, ID A , ID i ) R retrieves Z A from σ and searches L 2 for an entry of the form (m j , α j , h j ) and corresponding entry α j , V j from list L 3 that satisfies the follo wing condition,
If such an entry is present, R returns m j . Otherwise, returns ⊥. We note that if σ is a valid ciphertext, then h j is the correct value of H 2 (m j , α j ). If A has queried the H 2 oracle for these values, then an entry of the form (m j , α j , h j ) will be present in L 2 , which R retrieves. The only other case in which A produces a valid ciphertext is by correctly guessing the hash value. In a perfect simulation, this ciphertext using the correct guessed value should pass of as a valid one. But in our simulation, this does not happen. However we note that this event occurs only with a probability of 1/p which is of the order of 1/2 k , which is negligible in the security parameter k.
Challenge Phase: When A decides that phase 1 is over, he gives two messages m 0 and m 1 and a sender's identity ID A , algorithm R sets α = T , picks random c and responds with the challenge ciphertext σ * = c, X, y, L where X = r.s.f (s)P 0 , y = γ.s.g(s)Q 0 . Note that if T = g γ , then (X, y) is a valid encryption of α = g γ , although σ * may not be a valid ciphertext. Query phase 2: The adversary continues to issue queries with the constraint that no extraction query is made on ID i for ID i ∈ S * Guess Phase: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b R ignores the answer and searches L H 3 for an entry of the form (T, * ). If present, he outputs 1 (indicating that T = g γ ). Otherwise, he outputs 0.
We note that if (X, y) is a valid encryption of T , then an adversary with a non-negligible advantage in the above game must have issued a H 3 query on T , in which case an entry of the form (T, * ) will be present in L H 3 .
B Proof of Theorem 3
Let l be the maximum number of extraction queries that can be queried by the adversary A and N be the maximal size of the receiver set. Algorithm R takes as input (Q, sQ, s 2 Q, . . . , s l+N Q) and aims to find a pair (c, 1 c+s Q). In a setup phase, it builds a generator G ∈ G 1 , such that it knows l − 1 pairs (x i , 1 x i +s G) for x 1 , . . . , x l−1 ∈ R Z * p .To do so, -It picks β ∈ R Z * p and sets P = βQ -It picks x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l−1 ∈ R Z * p and expands f (z) = pass of as a valid one. But in our simulation, this does not happen, and we return ⊥. However we note that this event occurs only with a probability of 1/p which is of the order of 1/2 k , which is negligible in the security parameter k.
We are ready to apply the forking lemma that essentially says the following: consider a scheme producing signatures of the form (M, α, h, Z A ), where each of α, h, Z A corresponds to one of the three moves of a honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol. In our setting, from a forger A, we build an algorithm A that replays A a sufficient number of times to obtain two suitable forgeries (M * , α, h 1 , Z 1 ), (M * , α, h 2 , Z 2 ) on ID * . The reduction then works as follows. The simulator R runs A to obtain two forgeries (M * , α, h 1 , Z 1 ), (M * , α, h 2 , Z 2 ) for the same message M * and commitment α. At this stage, R recovers the pair (ID * , x * ) from list L 1 . If both forgeries satisfy the verification equation, we obtain the relations
i=0 a i z i and eventually computes
x * +s Q before returning the pair (x * , 1 x * +s Q) as a result.
We note as in [19] , if Adv
≥ 10(q sc + 1)(q sc + q H 2 )/2 k , where l extraction queries, q H i queries to random oracles H i (i= 1,2,3) and q sc signcryption queries are made, then
C Intractability of (U i , V i , F i ) − GDDHE In this section, we prove the intractability of distinguishing the two distributions involved in the (U i , V i , F i ) − GDDHE problems in the proofs of Theorems 2, 4 and 6.
In order to prove Corollaries 1, 2 and 3, we need to prove the intractability of (U i , V i , F i ) − GDDHE problem for i = 1, 2, 3 and then subsequently use the result of Theorem 1. We consider the case when G 1 = G 2 = G and thus pose Q 0 = βP 0 Our problem can be reformulated as (P, Q, F ) − GDHE where P = 1, s, s 2 , . . . , s l−1 , s.f (s), s 2 .f (s), s 3 .f (s), γ.s.f (s) β, s.β, s 2 .β. . . . , s N +2 .β, γ.β.g 1 (s), γ.β.g 2 (s), γ.β.g 3 (s), . . . , γ.β.g k (s) Q = 1 F = γ.β.f (s)
We have k = 1, 2 or 3 and deg(g i ) = 1, 3 or t for Corollaries 1,2 and 3 respectively. Degree of f is l. We have to show that F is independent of (P, Q), i.e. that no coefficients {a i,j } n i,j=1
and b 1 exist such that F = n i,j=1 a i,j p i p j + b 1 q 1 where the polynomials p i and q 1 are the one listed in P and Q above. By making all possible products of two polynomials from P which are multiples of γ.β, we want to prove that no linear combination among the polynomials from the list R below leads to F : 
